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R. A. Lynch
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San Diego, California
Summary
"Space operations are very costly." This simple 
state mentis widely accepted as true and is the major 
deterrent to the full utilization of space. This dis­ 
cussion concentrates on the major contributor to 
space operations cost: the launch system.
It will be shown, initially, how high current space 
operations costs are. The launch vehicle is a major 
element in the overall system operations cost. Ex­ 
tremely high launch costs are the major deterrent to 
increased space traffic. However, if space traffic is 
not maintained or increased, our entire space utiliza­ 
tion potential may disappear. Low-cost launch sys­ 
tems are needed now to ensure growth. We may be at 
a turning point.
Next, several low-cost launch-system concepts are 
discussed, including the low-cost expendable, 1-1/2 
stage or drop tank concept and the Triamese reusable 
launch vehicle/spacecraft concept.
Progress toward a reusable launch system has al­ 
ways been hampered by the "anti-low-cost launch-sys­ 
tem feedback loop. " Each element of this loop is ex­ 
amined to indicate that we may currently have the 
ability to break this loop and move forward.
This discussion is not based on a rigorous technical 
analysis, although it contains some technical elements. 
The ability to break the launch-cost bottleneck and pro­ 
ceed with space utilization is based on many nontech­ 
nical, political, psychological factors. Some of these 
more intangible factors are included in this discussion.
Current Launch Systems
Figure 1 presents some current launch vehicles with 
their operational cost per flight and a dollars per pound 
of delivered payload measure of efficiency. Two-way 
transportation of payload is even more expensive be­ 
cause launch vehicle payload must be invested in an 
entry vehicle. These costs seem high, but when com­ 
pared with other complex transportation systems they 
seem unexplainably high.
There have been many analogies made between 
modern commercial jet transports and space transporta­ 
tion systems. ^ These analogies serve two main pur­ 
poses. First, they tend to describe the space transporta­ 
tion problem in terms that all persons familiar with 
modern air travel might understand. Second, they 
supply a convenient target for the host of people that 
disagree with the manner in which they are done.
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Figure 1. Current Launch Systems
Figure 2 presents a picture of a Boeing 707 and a 
space logistic system using a Saturn IB launch vehicle 
and a semiballistic return capsule. The systems are 
comparable in size and complexity. The passenger 
safety requirements are of similar importance. If the 
systems are compared on an equal energy basis (foot­ 
pounds), the 707 would have to fly a round trip between 
Los Angeles and Saigon to expend energy equal to an 
orbital flight (~ 1012 foot-pounds). A passenger on the 
707 would pay~$940 while a passenger in the space 
logistic system would pay~ $800, 000 (assuming he was
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Figure 2. Transportation Systems
not required to pay his share of development cost for 
the logistic system). It should be noted here that the 
return trip from orbit greatly increases the cost over 
what is normally quoted for one-way delivery only.
Why are the aircraft costs so much less? The 
following may be reasons:
1. The airliner is fully reusable.
2. The airliner is designed for economical and 
rapid turnaround.
3. High airline utilization (traffic) spreads facility 
costs and development costs.
4. Aircraft development costs are relatively lower 
than those for spacecraft and expendable launch 
vehicles.
This discussion would lead to the general conclusion 
that one promising method of reducing launch costs is 
to develop a reusable launch system having airplane 
charateristics. This was a general conclusion of the 
AIAA Launch Vehicle Committee in March 1967 
(Ref. 1 quote from a comment by G.H. Stoner, vice 
president of Boeing, MI also can envision the eventual 
system as a single-stage-to-orbit vehicle similar in 
function and possibly appearance to the airplane of 
today"). These vehicles are now within our grasp, 
as will be discussed later.
The foregoing discussion presents a dilemma re­ 
garding reasons for the high cost of space transporta­ 
tion. Next, letf s examine the elements which make 
up the total cost (nonrecurring and recurring) of a 
space transportation system. Figure 3 presents a 
cost breakdown for the postulated NASA Advanced 
Logistic Support System (ALSS), This logistic system 
consists of a nine-man semiballistic crew module, a 
cargo-maneuvering module and an uprated Saturn. IB 
launch vehicle. The costs shown are based on devel­ 
opment of the logistic spacecraft and operation of the 
system for 133 flights to low earth orbit over a 
nine-year operational period. The useful payload of 
the system to a low earth orbit of 30 degrees inclina­
tion can be considered as 16, 500 pounds per flight. If 
total program cost, including development, is used as 
a basis, the payload delivery cost is $4, 050 per pound; 
(if development is excluded, this cost becomes $3, 780 
per pound). Comparing this cost with the costs of 
Figure 1 shows logistic resupply costs to be even 
higher than currently quoted basic launch vehicle costs.
It has been shown that logistic costs to orbit are 
relatively high when compared to transportation sys­ 
tems of equal sophistication, such as commercial 
transport. The next question is, why do logistic sys­ 
tems cost so much to operate and which elements of 
the system operation cost the most? Figure 4 shows 
a relatively detailed cost breakout of the ALSS des­ 
cribed above. The expendable portions of the cost 
bars are indicated by shading. Shading also indicates 
costs which are incurred because the recoverable sys­ 
tem components are not basically designed for reuse. 
It can be seen that approximately 66% of the total 
operational cost is incurred because hardware com­ 
ponents are expended and those that are recovered 
are not readily reusable.
In general, costs can be reduced appreciably by 
reusable systems or by major reductions in expend­ 
able costs. Both of these approaches will be explored 
later.
J ADVANCED LOGISTIC 
: SUPPORT SYSTEM
SEMIBALLISTIC 
CAPSULE
CARGO/
PROPULSION
MODULE
(IN MILLIONS)
moo I
SATURN IB
^SPACECRAFT 
DEVELOPMENT $ 699
.HARDWARE 
PROCUREMENT 5,505
.OPERATIONS 2,784
133 LAUNCHES 
9 YR.
$8,988
Figure 3. Advanced Logistic Support System 
(ALSS) Program
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Figure 4.
These high costs place space utilization in a very 
special management and political category. The 
reasons for a single space launch must be thoroughly 
justified, well in advance, through many tiers of 
management. Expendable hardware (launch vehicle) 
must be programmed well in advance. The launch 
vehicle must be completely loaded and possibly a 
group of relatively unrelated payloads must be 
assembled. The economic and political consequences 
of a failure (expenditure of launch vehicle and loss of 
payload) to achieve mission objectives are tremendous. 
This environment is not conducive to increased space 
utilization.
Mission Potential
ALSS Cost Breakdown
One key to lower launch costs is mission justifica­ 
tion and increased traffic. Space missions fail into 
three major categories: scientific, commercial, and 
military. None of these areas alone can probably 
justify a new launch system; but together they can. 
From a scientific point of view, the earth orbital 
space station seems a logical next step. The logistic 
support system is a major element in a space station 
program (Figure 5). Also, station flexibility is 
severely hampered by the extreme premium placed on 
reducing the number of logistic vehicle trips using 
expendable launch systems.
While the space station itself may be considered a 
scientific mission, the scientific/engineering task of 
providing a low-cost space transporation system may 
be a mission of equal or greater importance. There 
is considerable historical precedent for NACA and 
NASA providing basic aircraft research which was 
used by the military and commercial interests to 
create the air transportation system we have today.
Regarding commercial use of space, I think it is 
sufficient to state that real commercial use of space 
cannot take place until payioad delivery costs are well 
below the current ~ $500 per pound.
A real justification for space utilization currently 
lies in the military area. There are a myriad of 
military orbital and suborbital uses of space. It is
COST 
(BILLION $)
34% LOGISTIC 
SYSTEM
29% LABORATORY 
SYSTEM
14%MISSION 
OPERATIONS
11% PROGRAM 
MANAGEMENT
CREW TRAINING 
FACILITIES
MORL: MANNED ORBITING RESEARCH LAB.
5-YEAR OPERATION 
4 LOGISTIC FLIGHTS/YR. 
APOLLO SPACECRAFT 
SATURN IB LAUNCH VEHICLE
Figure 5. Space Station System Cost
only possible to state in this unclassified paper that 
all of these potential uses depend primarily on an 
economical and flexible launch system.
There are currently missions being performed in 
space (Figure 6) which could be performed more 
economically using a low-cost launch system. The 
current trend seems to be one of "leveling off," We 
may be reaching a point in space activities where 
current high costs are stifling traffic growth. The 
new flexible, economic launch vehicle system must 
come first; and the missions will follow.
5? 1 58 I S9 160 1 fel ( 62 1 63 I 64165 I 6616? 1 fcB 169 I 70 1 71 I 7? I
Figure 6. Space Traffic
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Potential Launch Systems
As was shown in the ALSS example above, launch 
costs represented about 66% of the total logistic sup­ 
port program costs. Two approaches are currently 
being considered to reduce launch costs.
1. Low cost expendable systems.
2. Reusable systems.
Low-cost expendable approaches make use of 
"head-end steering, tr low-cost tank construction and 
"simple" pressure-fed engine systems. "Head-end 
steering" can be used as a generalized term to des­ 
cribe a concept which places all of the expensive com­ 
ponents such as guidance in a reusable spacecraft on 
top of the low-cost booster. In some cases, the atti­ 
tude control or steering during launch is provided by 
rocket motors mounted on the reusable spacecraft and 
the main boost engines are not required to gimbal.
Expendable launch vehicle costs arise from two 
considerations. First, the cost of the equipment and 
structure which is expended. Second, the cost of the 
testing and checkout to assure that the first and only 
flight the vehicle will make is successful. The low- 
cost expendable approach is not likely to be success­ 
ful for three reasons:
1. Without a complete break with aerospace indus­ 
try and government/customer practices, the 
development and production of a low-cost ex­ 
pendable launch vehicle is impossible. The 
current state of the art in aircraft and launch 
vehicles results in very sophisticated, high- 
performance, high-reliability hardware. It 
would require a major revision to direct this 
well established contractor/customer industry 
to an "ammunition" approach.
2. The desire for successful operation on the first 
and only flight may cause test and checkout 
costs to overshadow the low launch vehicle 
hardware cost.
3. A launch system having low-cost lower stages 
still requires a sophisticated reusable upper 
stage to carry the guidance system and provide 
mission functions.
It is not the objective of this discussion to pursue 
the low-cost expendable approach to any great degree, 
especially in view of the interesting and promising 
reusable systems which now exist.
The reusable launch vehicle approach is now about 
10 years old. Myriads of vehicle concepts have been 
investigated, ranging from fixed wings attached to 
vertical takeoff rockets to the sophisticated air 
collection Spaceplane.
These reusable launch systems have not moved 
ahead for one or more of the following reasons.
1. High development cost.
2. High development risk, stemming from an 
inadequate technology base.
3. Lack of mission justification.
4. Apathy toward high expendable system launch 
costs.
5. Heavy commitment to specific concurrent 
expendable launch vehicles.
6. Insufficient flexibility for mission or payload.
7. Not really reusable, and thus having high re­ 
furbishment cost.
In addition to all of these specific reasons, the timing 
relative to national requirements has not been optimal. 
Many of these problems have been overcome, and 
current launch systems are extremely promising and 
timely. Numerous studies have shown that reusable 
spacecraft, particularly lifting types, provide opera­ 
tional flexibility and economy as far as spacecraft 
reuse is concerned. However, when a current ex­ 
pendable launch vehicle is used to launch these space­ 
craft, system costs become prohibitive. The stage- 
and-one-half (1-1/2 stage) or drop tank concept shown 
in Figure 7 was the first concept which really attacked 
this problem. Here, a single reusable spacecraft, 
incorporating rocket propulsion, is used to perform 
both launch and spacecraft function. The drop tanks 
used to supply propellants to the engines during the 
initial launch are relatively simple and low cost. Of 
course, the success of this concept depends to a large 
degree on the ability to produce large, light-weight, 
cryogenic drop tanks at low cost. Tank structure cost 
estimates range between $50 and $100 per pound, 
which means that the expendable tank costs for a 
flight range between $2. 3 and $4. 7 million for a sys­ 
tem providing a 14, 000-pound payload to a low earth 
orbit.
In an effort to provide increased capability and re­ 
duce system dependence on the drop tank costs, the 
Triamese system was evolved. In this case, three 
identical elements are used as shown in Figure 8. 
One element (or stage) is designated the orbiter and 
two are used as boosters. All rocket engines are 
burning at vertical liftoff, and the orbiter engines are 
using propellant being cross-fed from the boosters. 
The boost elements are staged off when empty, and 
the orbit element continues to orbit on its own inter­ 
nal propellant. The boost elements perform an aero­ 
dynamic lifting body recovery downrange, extend their 
stowed wings and engines subsonically, and cruise 
back to the launch site to make a normal aircraft 
horizontal landing. When the orbiter has completed 
its mission, it performs a lifting body entry and re­ 
turns to the launch site in a manner similar to the 
two boost elements. In this operation there are no 
items expended, and the entire mission is performed 
by a single vehicle design. In concept, the Triamese 
is developed and performs like the ideal "single-stage- 
to-orbit" system without the serious technology prob­ 
lems. The fact that three identical vehicles are 
attached in parallel during the initial boost has a 
relatively minor influence on system operation or 
economy. *
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LAUNCHWT. 899,680 LB. 
PAYLOAD 14,000 LB.
The Triamese system technology is a direct out­ 
growth of the well established expendable launch ve­ 
hicle. Figure 9 shows that the Triamese element 
consists of an expendable launch vehicle structural 
core around which are wrapped lightly loaded fairings 
that thermally protect the structure and equipment 
and provide a hypersonic lifting body shape.
The variable geometry, or stowable wing concept, 
has been shown to provide efficient subsonic perform­ 
ance while being lighter than competing approaches. 
Stowable wings are used on the Triamese element to 
serve several essential functions. The wings permit 
efficient subsonic performance without the necessity 
of a delta pianform on the basic body. The essentially 
cylindrical elements are easy to stack in parallel for 
launch. Subsonic cruiseback of the boost elements to 
the launch site is efficiently performed.
STAGE TANKS: 
18,100 FPS
The internal arrangement of a Triamese orbital 
element is shown in Figure 10. The only major dif­ 
ference between an orbital element and a boost ele­ 
ment is that, in the boost element, the cylindrical 
sections of the propellant tanks are extended into the 
central cargo/equipment bay.
Figure 7. 1-1/2 Stage System
LAUNCH WT. 
PAYLOAD
tk2/
1,143,000 LB. 
18,500 LB.
ORBITAL ELEMENT 
TO ORBIT
STAGING 
-8000 FPS
LAUNCH
\E
ORBITAL ELEMENT
BOOST ELEMENT 
CRUISEBACK
\ BOOST ELEMENT (2) i^88s!p^^
N/^r-ini-r A i r-i r-»nr-M-r T^—————————————————————————————— —"300 N.MI."
Figure 8. Triamese System
EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE
REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE 
Figure 9. Triamese Configuration Evolution
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PERSONNEL
ESCAPE
CAPSULE
250K HIGH-PRESSURE ENGINES (2)
HYDROGEN TANK 
CARGO 
EQUIPMENT
TURBO-FAN LENGTH 118 FT. 
ENGINE LAUNCH WT. 358,000 LB.
PAYLOAD 18,500 LB.
ENTRY WT. 67,500 - 86,000 LB. 
Figure 10. Triamese Orbital Element
In addition to economy, the Triamese concept offers 
other operational flexibility. As shown in Figure 11, 
after the system is fully proven, it may be launched 
at any azimuth since expended hardware is not jettison­ 
ed, and the hazard to people and property should be no 
greater than for overflight of aircraft.
The Triamese system has good growth capability 
for a completely reusable system. Increased payload 
can be provided by adding plugs in the constant body 
section as shown in Figure 12. This type of growth 
would be dependent upon normally expected rocket 
engine thrust growth. Triamese elements can also be 
assembled in parallel in various numbers for special 
missions and provide growth as shown in Figure 13.
The Triamese can be developed economically by 
combining rocket and aircraft techniques. Initial flights 
would be made using the turbofan engines for horizontal 
takeoff with no propellant aboard. Single-element verti­ 
cal takeoff flights would be made to gradually higher 
velocities, reaching about 18, 000 feet per second. 
The element thus could be gradually exposed to more 
severe heating and loads. Finally, launch economy 
permits testing a Triamese for a number of flights ap­ 
proaching its required life within a short development 
program to verify structural and subsystem life.
A Triamese system shows cost reduction potential 
when compared with the ALSS system discussed 
earlier, as shown in Figure 14. In this comparison, 
expendable launch vehicle practices have been retained 
to some extent for the Triamese system. Triamese 
system costs may be further reduced (~ 50%) if full 
aircraft development techniques are used.
FOUR BOOST ELEMENTS
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Figure 11. Triamese Unrestricted Launch 
Azimuth Capability
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Figure 12. Growth by Body Stretch
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Figure 13. Growth by Multiple Elements
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Reusable Launch System Evaluation
The major reasons for not proceeding with a new 
system have been mentioned above and are summar­ 
ized in Figure 15 as the "anti-low-cost launch-system 
feedback loop. " Only semitechnical reasons are 
discussed here, and it must be remembered that many 
important political factors also prevail (e.g., com­ 
petition with concurrent expendable systems).
Expendable launch vehicles are currently available 
in sufficient variety, development costs have been 
paid, and operating costs are closely related to traffic. 
Each expendable launch must be very highly justified 
to warrant the large expenditure. Low traffic means 
low program cost. In the ridiculous extreme, if no 
expendable vehicles were flown, the cost would be 
minimum providing also that no vehicles were built. 
Figure 15 shows the current feedback loop from ex­ 
pendable launch systems through low traffic right back 
to expendable systems.
Exploring the other main leg in Figure 15, the re­ 
usable launch system alternate has been pursued for 
many years. Excessive development risk, development 
cost, and operating cost have been used as the chief 
reasons not to follow this approach. Turnaround cost 
(i.e., refurbishment) has been cited as the reason for 
high operating cost. Development and operating costs 
must be evaluated relative to the anticipated traffic. 
If traffic maintains its current level or increases, a 
reusable launch system having sufficient mission flexi­ 
bility becomes a logical choice. In summary, expend­ 
able launch systems are associated with declining 
space activity, and reusable launch systems should be 
identified with a continuing or growing space program.
With the loop described above firmly established in 
the technical/political community, what will permit a 
promising concept such as Triamese to move forward 
to realization? Three elements in the loop are chang­ 
ing. First, we have reached the point where we have 
strong desires to go on more missions than our budget 
can afford in terms of expendable launch vehicles (the 
National Space Station, MOL support, and advanced 
military systems). Second, technology has slowly 
progressed to the point where a concept such as Tria­
mese is definitely approaching state of the art. Third, 
we almost admit that a new spacecraft concept is needed 
(low g lifting entry, horizontal landing, on dry land, in 
a reusable condition), and if we can combine the space­ 
craft function with a reusable launch vehicle function 
in a single reasonable cost program, we are interested.
The following paragraphs present seven of the major 
reasons given in the past for delaying reusable launch 
vehicle development. Each statement is accompanied 
by current reasons why a system such as Triamese 
should proceed.
1. Statement: Reusable launch vehicle develop­ 
ment costs are high.
Status: Spacecraft users (NASA, Air Force) 
have developed a strong desire to have a new 
spacecraft with increased mission flexibility and 
improved reusability. These users are talking 
routinely about development programs approach­ 
ing $1 billion spread over five or six years 
(ALSS development cost is estimated to be $700 
million over four years). A reusable launch 
vehicle such as Triamese can be developed with 
a similar budget and timing because technology 
requirements are similar although physical sizes 
are different.
2. Statement: Reusable launch vehicle development 
risk is high because an inadequate technology 
base exists.
Status: Past reusable launch vehicle concepts 
have been dependent on a wide range of technolo­ 
gies. Many concepts required exotic airbreath- 
ing propulsion schemes and sustained hypersonic 
flight in the atmosphere. The Triamese concept 
is derived chiefly from a combination of current 
expendable liquid propellant launch vehicle tech­ 
nology with subsonic aircraft technology. light­ 
weight thermal protection systems to provide 
protection during entry is perhaps the most 
critical technology remaining. However, the 
ability to use uncoated superalloy heat shields 
because of low entry planform loading is an 
important relieving factor.
3. Statement: There are insufficient predicted 
future missions to warrant the development 
cost of a reusable launch vehicle.
Status: Figure 16 presents the classic cost-ver- 
sus-traffic plots for an expendable and a reusable 
system. Certain conservative assumptions have 
been used in this figure. The expendable system 
requires no further development and the Apollo 
spacecraft and other investment costs are ignored. 
The initial Triamese development and investment 
costs are high ($2. 5 billion) by a factor of 2 if 
true aircraft development procedures are used. 
Triamese turnaround cost of $3 million per launch 
is high for true aircraft-like operation. Even 
with these conservative assumptions the Triamese 
system begins to show savings after 60 launches. 
Referring to Figure 6, it is seen that 60 launches 
per year is approximately our current rate. We 
currently have sufficient traffic potential to war-.
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Figure 16. Program Cost Comparisons
rant the development of a reusable launch system. 
If this development is not begun soon, new space 
applications will not develop and traffic may 
decrease to the point where development of a new 
low-cost launch system is not warranted.
4. Statement: The expendable launch systems we 
have are quite expensive to operate, but they 
are adequate to support our current programs 
requiring limited flights.
Status: The lunar program, based on a national 
goal, is reaching a peak and may be tapering off 
in activity. Both NASA with the National Space 
Station, and the Air Force with MOL and its 
possible successors, are in need of a logistic 
support system. Government budgets are not 
capable of handling the desired frequency of 
logistic support using current expendable launch 
vehicles. We cannot expand our space activities 
based on the costs of current expendable launch 
vehicles.
5. Statement: We are heavily committed in terms 
of personnel, facilities, funds, etc., to our
current Saturn and Titan expendable launch 
vehicles,
Status: It is becoming apparent that the current 
expendable launch vehicles are too expensive to
use. Jusification of new missions is too difficult 
considering the sizeable cost of each additional 
flight. The best way to reduce the cost of an ex­ 
pendable launch vehicle is not to use it. An even 
more economical approach is not to build any 
more expendable vehicles. This logic quickly 
results in the death of a space program. Our 
immediate future approach may not be this de­ 
cisive, but it certainly may retard the growth 
of space utilization.
6. Statement: Your reusable launch vehicle concept 
does not have the mission and pay load flexibility 
obtainable with an expendable launch vehicle and 
a reusable spacecraft/service module concept.
Status: Some early reusable launch systems, 
particularly airbreathing types, could not readily 
handle varying size and volume payloads. As 
discussed above and shown in Figure 13, the 
parallel-staged, modular concept of the Triamese 
permits growth to cover a wide range of payloads. 
Also, although it is much larger, the Triamese 
element has all the mission capability of a reus­ 
able spacecraft plus added features such as sub- 
orbital and aero-cruise capability and large 
available internal volume. However, it must be 
admitted that a large orbiting element is not as 
efficient as a smaller spacecraft with an expend­ 
able propulsion module, if extensive propulsive 
maneuvers in orbit are required. However, the 
Triamese system acting as a tanker for a space 
shuttle is attractive.
7. Statement: Reusable launch vehicles are not 
really fully reusable without extensive and very 
expensive refurbishing.
Status: Reusable launch vehicles can be designed 
and developed to require minimum turnaround 
servicing if an aircraft philosophy is adopted. 
The only real difference between the turnaround 
of a large jet aircraft and a reusable launch 
vehicle is that the environment experienced by 
each is slightly different. Complexity, safety 
requirements, etc., are very similar. There- 
usable launch vehicle can be designed for its
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more severe environment and then can be econ­ 
omically tested on a number of flights approach­ 
ing its anticipated service life (maybe 50 flights). 
An aircraft does not have the luxury of a full life 
test during its development.
It is important when discussing reusable launch 
vehicles that the classic term "refurbishment" not be 
used and the terms "servicing, maintenance, etc. , " 
be substituted. The term refurbishment implies that 
the vehicle is damaged to some extent and must be 
disassembled and partially rebuilt. This is the wrong 
philosophy for a reusable launch vehicle.
General Observations
1. It is becoming increasingly evident that full utiliza­ 
tion of space cannot proceed until recurring pay- 
load delivery costs can be decreased from ~$500 
to ~$20 per pound.
2. The expendable launch vehicle portion of a typical 
space program represents ~ 66% of the total pro­ 
gram cost. Therefore, the creation of an economi­ 
cal reusable launch vehicle provides the potential 
of significant program cost reduction.
3. Current and immediate future space traffic is suf­ 
ficient to justify a new reusable launch system. 
Space mission traffic may be currently reaching a 
maximum unless economical launch is available 
to encourage further mission expansion.
4. The Triamese reusable launch vehicle/spacecraft 
concept is representative of a new breed of vehicles 
which are available using mostly current technology. 
The major attraction of the Triamese concept is 
that it provides a completely reusable system with 
the development of a single vehicle.
5. The "anti-low-cost launch-system feedback loop" 
is still in operation. However, many of the ele­ 
ments of the loop have weakened, and the possibility 
of breaking the loop is close at hand. Potential 
space traffic is a key element in the loop and unless 
we move soon, the relatively modest space traffic 
we now can predict may begin to decrease, and full 
space utilization and the reusable launch system 
may die together.
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